The Multi-Tiered Hierarchy of the Iranian Military

An overview of the development of a unique, multi-faceted military organization that parallels Iranian society Iran's armed forces hierarchy is distinctive, with its conventional army tracing its roots back to the Safavid period in the early sixteenth century. This traditional military structure is counterbalanced by the Revolutionary Guard, which emerged during the revolution as a somewhat ambiguous paramilitary force. Over time, the Revolutionary Guard has assumed many responsibilities typically associated with the conventional military, while also expanding its role in unconventional foreign operations. Both branches operate under the complete control of the Ayatollah and the clerics, forging a direct link between Islamic authority, revolutionary ideals, and military command. Another significant component of this hierarchy is the Basij, a force that blends auxiliary police duties, enforcement of moral standards, and internal security, functioning loosely under the Revolutionary Guard's direction. The intricate relationships, chains of command, and ambiguous doctrines within these forces highlight the complexity of Iran’s security establishment and underscore the considerable challenges the country faces in addressing both international relations and internal dissent against the regime's autocracy. The modern evolution of the Iranian military can be characterized by four distinct phases:

1. The ambition to become the "Policeman of the Gulf" in the 1970s marked a significant shift in regional dynamics.
2. Following the revolution, a purge swept through the ranks, reshaping the political landscape.
3. The Iran-Iraq War emerged as a crucible for the Iranian military, testing its resolve and forging a new identity amid conflict.
4. This period saw the rise of an Islamically aligned, battle-hardened enforcement apparatus dedicated to promoting the Islamic revolutionary spirit. Iran's efforts to modernize its armed forces between 1970 and 1979 ultimately faltered due to the weak connections between the military and Iranian society, coupled with an overreliance on technology. Essential work to establish a coherent doctrine, effective strategy, and continuity within the military chain of command was largely neglected, overshadowed by the ever-shifting power dynamics of the time. With the downfall of the Shah, the rise of Islamic komitehs, and the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran lost many of its skilled technicians and the modern edge of its armed forces, reverting instead to grassroots nationalism. This nationalism fostered an environment conducive to authoritarian rule and underscored the role of the Basij in suppressing events like the Green Revolution. Deeply intertwined with revolutionary ideology, this grassroots nationalism has created a vast infrastructure engaged in both external and internal operations, blurring the lines between national defense and domestic political repression. The mechanisms of oppression that emerged are a direct result of Iran's rapid and dramatic transition from the Shah's regime to that of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Iran Under the Shah

As an authoritarian monarchy, Iran and the Shah gained strategic importance in the 1940s during World War II, when the Americans and British invested significant resources to transport supplies to the Soviets in their fight against a Nazi invasion, leading to the occupation of Iran by both Allied forces. The Shah played a crucial role in establishing transportation and communication systems, continuing his modernization efforts by connecting urban areas and centralizing the government administration across the country. In many ways, the relatively efficient movement of people and ideas enabled the Soviets to support an independence agenda that was already gaining traction in Iran, particularly among the Azeris, Kurds, and Balochis. These ethnic groups, historically on the fringes, had previously led insurrections but now found renewed backing from Soviet proxies. The persistent uprisings along Iran's periphery, which had endured for centuries, exposed the shortcomings of the Shah’s defense and security apparatus, serving as a catalyst for the modernization of his armed forces. Over the next thirty years, the Shah would grapple with internal security challenges while simultaneously striving to establish Iran as a regional powerhouse, equipped with the necessary mechanisms and resources to achieve both objectives.

Modernization Issues

The Shah emerged from the Anglo-Soviet occupation of the 1940s and navigated the internal political threat posed by Mosaddeq’s anti-imperial nationalism, aided by American and British intelligence agencies. In 1955, he leveraged the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a coalition of Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran, to bolster his role as a regional power and sought military equipment from both the US and the Soviets. Following the fall of the Iraqi monarchy to Pan-Arab supporters of the Soviets, Iran found itself at the heart of American Cold War strategy and requested further support from the United States through a bilateral defense agreement in 1959. However, indicative of his future approach to maximizing requests from both American and Soviet interests, the Kennedy administration noted in 1961 that the Shah “insists on our supporting an expensive army too large for border incidents and internal security and of no use in an all-out war.” The events that ultimately propelled the massive Iranian military modernization effort began in 1971 with the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which doubled Iran’s oil revenues in less than a year due to its controlled distribution model. In 1971, Iran's oil revenue stood at $885 million, but by 1975, it had surged to $17.8 billion—a twenty-fold increase. Additionally, in 1971, the British completed their withdrawal from Iran, and according to the Nixon Doctrine, the US anticipated that the region would police itself without direct American involvement. In light of these developments, Iran dramatically increased its defense expenditures from $900 million to $9.4 billion—a tenfold rise that facilitated the acquisition of essential military equipment and the formation of a new corps of skilled military professionals, all aimed at enhancing Iranian influence in the region.

US Interests in Iran

The United States initially supported the buildup of the Iranian military but struggled to establish sustainable development models that could address the imbalances in Gulf security, Iran’s economic growth needs, and the necessity for a comprehensive yet realistic defense strategy. The US maintained a complex relationship with the region, ceding influence to the British after World War II and throughout the 1960s, even actively stepping back from oil production opportunities that emerged following the Iranian coup in 1953. However, the fear of communism's spread compelled the US to re-engage with Iran, despite the British withdrawal and the Nixon Doctrine's commitment to allow regions to support themselves. The Shah adeptly convinced the US that loyalty to the West was not guaranteed, frequently purchasing military hardware from the Soviets to fuel an influence battle and secure increased funding. The threat posed by the Soviets in Iran was indeed real; later Soviet records reveal plans to instigate coups by manipulating ethnic minorities and corrupt government officials. While the US recognized that Iran could at best slow a full-scale Soviet assault, it also saw the potential for Iran to serve as an additional shield and a strategic foothold in Central Asia, as well as a friendly state to patrol the Gulf and maintain order in a region from which the US was otherwise withdrawing.

Policeman of the Gulf

Despite the American Twin Pillar strategy of supporting both Iran and the militarily weaker Arab states under Saudi leadership to balance the power structure in the region, Iran maintained the upper hand in negotiations due to its economic strength and geopolitical significance during the Cold War. Furthermore, the Soviet support for Iraq and marginalized Iranian ethnic groups—such as the Kurds, Balochis, and Azeris—pushed the Shah to assert even greater dominance over the Gulf. This military arms acquisition raised concerns not only among the underdeveloped Arab nations of the time but also within the CIA, which crafted a psychological profile labeling the Shah as a "dangerous megalomaniac." Despite the U.S. reluctance to engage in the region, the Soviet expansion in Central Asia positioned Iran as a crucial bulwark against the spread of communism. The Artesh, the term commonly used for the Iranian Armed Forces, achieved notable success in modernization during the 1970s. They adopted the U.S. and British military models, overhauling their training systems, command structures, and technical manuals with direct assistance from Western advisors. Their involvement in the Omani counter-insurgency campaign, where they seized and held significant territories in support of the Omani government, earned praise from Western advisors and conflict monitors. They were particularly commended for establishing a robust logistics network for deployed soldiers and for their incremental yet sustainable methods of advancement. However, the rapid pace of military buildup led to significant challenges, most notably a lack of continuity in leadership within the officer and non-commissioned officer ranks. Untested and increasingly partisan military leaders ascended through the ranks without acquiring the essential experience needed for effective command, resulting in consequences that reverberated throughout the revolution and significantly weakened the Iranian military—both in its operational capabilities and in its standing with the Iranian public. A substantial portion of the military buildup focused on acquiring advanced technical equipment—aircraft, ships, missile systems, and more. This reliance meant that even minor disruptions among their specially trained technicians or the need for replacements could trigger uncontrollable ripple effects throughout the military. Moreover, the armed forces were ill-prepared to handle threats such as internal dissent or small-scale skirmishes with the necessary precision and proportionality. The Artesh aimed to build a military capable of controlling the Gulf and acting as a regional enforcer, but this unbalanced growth led to increasingly critical flaws in the Iranian political-military relationship.

The Shah’s Instability

The Shah’s growing irascibility and inflated sense of grandeur ultimately became his undoing. While Cold War tensions initially kept his military in check, the surge in oil revenue and American encouragement to adopt a western-friendly stance and assert a leadership role in the Gulf further fueled the Shah’s ambition to modernize an externally focused military, relegating internal issues to regional police and the gendarmerie. While the Shah may have been justified in modernizing an aging fleet of aircraft, ships, and missiles, his efforts culminated in the purchase of advanced equipment like the F-14, which featured sophisticated avionics that even the U.S.—the very developers of the technology—struggled to integrate into their own fleet and strategic objectives. A telling example of this misalignment is evident in the allocation of military spending: while a typical military might devote around 3% of its budget to artillery, Iran allocated nearly 30%. This disproportionate focus on massive strikes came at the cost of essential intelligence sharing and joint operations, both crucial for the effective use of such weaponry. Despite the high praise from future U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, who admired the tailored uniforms and formidable weaponry during a 1978 parade, the Iranian military of the 1970s was plagued by significant shortcomings. The Shah grew increasingly concerned about the threat of a coup, leading him to frequently shuffle his officers and remove those who appeared too powerful or influential among the troops. This lack of continuity hindered commanders from developing long-term visions for their units or building the personal connections necessary to fully grasp their missions and implement vital changes. Through SAVAK and his internal security team, he monitored and restricted communication between military commanders, preventing them from forming alliances or establishing power bases, which severely undermined essential communication. Moreover, Iranian technical talent struggled to keep pace with the rapid acquisition of advanced equipment, forcing reliance on American maintainers and technicians, as well as U.S. factories for replacement parts. Ultimately, the Shah's tendency to promote a small circle of sycophants to high-ranking positions, rather than genuinely competent officers, strained the relationship between him and the majority of the military. He specifically opposed military involvement in politics, leading to the isolation of conscripts from civilian society, which viewed the military as distant and unreliable.

Shah Downfall

The Artesh primarily concentrated on external security and patrolling the Gulf, particularly in defense against Iraqi raids along the Shatt al-Arab waterway. These tensions escalated, prompting both countries to fully mobilize their armies along the border in 1969 and again in 1971. Meanwhile, the domestic situation was rapidly deteriorating. Throughout the '60s and '70s, the Shah violently suppressed dissent among ethnic minorities and tribal leaders, such as the Qashqai and Bakhtiari. While this resulted in brief periods of calm, it also sparked a new wave of underground political activism in the fringes of Iranian territory, leading to numerous skirmishes between militants and gendarmeries. In urban areas, the widespread repression of the Left and Islamists backfired, inadvertently strengthening support and sympathy for both groups. For instance, when the Shah ordered the arrest of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1963, Tehran erupted in three days of violent protests, resulting in over three hundred deaths and several hundred injuries. This incident highlighted the inadequacy of both the gendarmerie and the military, which responded with lethal force and brutal tactics, escalating what could have been a limited protest. This marked the beginning of a series of protest escalations over the next fifteen years, setting the stage for further violence in domestic affairs. By 1978, protests led by Islamists intensified while the Shah concentrated on external threats. At the same time, Leftist guerrilla groups executed bombings and assassinations within Iran. The Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), the militant wing of the Tudeh Leftist party, emerged as one of the most formidable groups, successfully robbing banks to finance their operations. Following the assassination of eight American military advisors and contractors between 1973 and 1976, the U.S. exerted pressure on the Shah to suppress these Leftist factions. This may explain his neglect of the rising populist Islamic parties that were calling for his overthrow. By May of 1977, Iran's oil revenue had plummeted, pushing millions into unemployment and into the embrace of populist leaders, particularly the mullahs, who were quick to exploit the economic downturn. As Khomeini and his supporters organized protests throughout 1978, the Shah was losing support from nearly every segment of Iranian society due to his autocratic rule and his focus on external threats that offered little benefit to the average citizen. Ayatollah Khomeini recognized the crucial need to prevent military intervention in the protests, so his followers built personal connections with conscripts while keeping their leadership isolated from the troops. They exerted pressure on the families of conscripts and recruited others to disseminate revolutionary literature, appealing to both leftists and Islamists. They urged conscripts to honor their religious duties by deserting the military, promising them roles within the revolutionary movement if they abandoned their posts. In January 1978, when a government newspaper editorial attributed the rise in violence to Islamic extremists without acknowledging its own role in the escalation, protests erupted. Troops shot two mullahs, and their turbans were displayed as symbols of the brutal repression faced by ordinary Iranians. Protests quickly spread to Tabriz and Tehran, prompting the Shah to deploy paratroopers to arrest student leaders at the university. When the initially neutral and moderate Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim Shariat-Madari was injured, he actively joined the opposition, rallying his numerous followers, who in turn mobilized members of his mosque network. This shift dramatically altered the dynamics and balance of power. In response, the Shah dismissed General Nassiri and over thirty officers of SAVAK, the very agency that could have provided crucial intelligence about the protests. This decision not only dismantled an essential organization and demoralized its agents but also painted the Shah as weak and indecisive for capitulating to pressure. The situation escalated further when Islamic militants locked the Cinema Rex movie theater and set it ablaze, resulting in the deaths of four hundred moviegoers. The horrific act was wrongly attributed to the government and disillusioned SAVAK agents. Marches swelled to hundreds of thousands, and the Shah responded by dismissing even more officers, releasing prisoners, and attempting to negotiate. Once again, the protestors perceived the Shah as weak. When orders for martial law in Jaleh were poorly communicated, troops killed over two hundred citizens in what is now known as “Black Friday.” This series of protests spiraled beyond the government's control, and the Shah's responses only undermined his own agencies without yielding any benefit. He remained out of touch with reality, creating numerous opportunities for the revolutionaries to exploit.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s Return

The final days of the Shah’s rule unfolded when military commanders refused to intervene in a student-led revolution in Tehran in November 1978, leading to a complete withdrawal from other engagements. In a desperate move, the Shah appointed the indecisive General Azhari as Prime Minister, which further alienated the military. Officers struggled to cope with an astronomical desertion rate, with over a thousand enlisted troops leaving daily. Last-ditch efforts to censor publications, close universities, and deploy military vehicles—including tanks—onto the streets only fueled public unrest. Following a heart attack, PM Azhari resigned, leaving the government in disarray. In a final attempt to stabilize the situation, the Americans dispatched General Robert Huyser to Iran to rehabilitate the military and restore some semblance of command structure. However, the Artesh showed little initiative in formulating a contingency plan, instead clinging to the hope that the United States would intervene on a large scale. They refused to act without explicit approval from the Shah. As Stephen Ward notes, “The generals wanted Huyser to tell them what to do, the Shah came to believe that the American general was responsible for arranging a deal between the revolutionaries and the military to end the monarchy, and the revolutionaries were convinced Huyser was in Iran to promote a coup.” In a prescient warning, Huyser cautioned the military that they would be the first to be purged in a new regime, a grim prediction that would prove true as many were executed in the years that followed. Upon Khomeini’s return, many generals mistakenly believed they were immune from punishment due to their influence and expertise, expecting to be consulted during the transition period after the revolution. However, the rank structure and the relationship between the revolutionaries and the military had descended into chaos. Almost immediately, various Islamic groups, including a significant number of former military personnel, formed kohmitehs and began enforcing Islamic law, as well as conducting trials for those involved in the earlier repression of the revolution. Many of these groups operated independently of Khomeini’s control, leading to a chaotic security situation. In May, Khomeini established the Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e Equlab-e Eslami, better known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a paramilitary force that would reshape Iran’s armed forces. Aiming to create a parallel military that could eventually take command of the conventional forces, the Guard recruited individuals aligned with Islamic ideals and consolidated many of the kohmitehs and other militant groups to maintain domestic order. Khomeini viewed this as an opportunity to bring various militant and rival Islamic factions under his influence. However, allowing them the freedom to enforce social order and morality would have dire consequences for large segments of urban Iran. In a strategic maneuver, he permitted the kohmitehs to undertake more challenging missions with social implications, such as overseeing morality. Depending on the outcomes, he could either take credit for their actions or distance himself from the individual kohmitehs. By 1983, most kohmitehs were operating under Khomeini’s command, while the remainder were purged along with Leftist elements. The military became the primary target for revolutionary reprisals, with all bases closely monitored by Guard and later Basij units to prevent any unauthorized movements. In the first six months of the revolution, over four hundred generals and senior security officers were executed, while countless others were arrested, imprisoned, or went missing. Much of this violence stemmed from personal vendettas and ambitions for future promotions. The military itself faced more than 250,000 desertions, as members chose to flee rather than risk being caught in the deadly purge. To offset the loss of personnel, recruitment for both the Artesh and the Guard surged in impoverished rural areas, where Khomeini-aligned clerics established a strictly Islamic education system for the military. Virtually all soldiers with essential technical skills were subjected to remedial morality training centered on Islamic principles, alongside an endless cycle of committees tasked with redefining the military's structure and purpose. It wasn't until the eve of the Iraq War that the purges finally ceased, particularly as the new government realized that many of the technical experts on weapon systems and tactics had either fled Iran or resigned. Khomeini made efforts to halt the purges by offering full amnesty to military personnel and delivering broadcast sermons that sought to forgive the military. However, the damage to the Artesh had already been done. By the mid-1980s, the Guard boasted over twenty-five thousand dedicated members, with around 100,000 in reserve. However, their tactical training was severely limited, primarily focused on small-scale repression of political groups, with no preparation for actual warfare. Following the purge of the Artesh, Iran found itself ill-equipped to operate militarily in the region. Khomeini devoted an excessive amount of time to redefining the military and its objectives in Islamic terms, rather than gearing up for modern combat engagements. He established a Political-Ideological Directorate under the Ministry of Defense, staffed by clerics who were present down to the platoon level to provide Islamic guidance during military operations and assess the religious observance of individual soldiers. This intervention led to a significant breakdown in trust within the ranks, severely damaging interpersonal relations. At the same time, as the military's operational capacity dwindled, threats along Iran’s borders began to escalate, with autonomy movements reigniting among Kurds, Balochis, and Arabs. The military attempted to intervene but was in disarray—many platoons refused to deploy or engage with protestors, while others responded with excessive force. Seizing the opportunity, Iraq began arming Kurdish groups and funneling money and trainers into Iran, aiming to weaken the Iranian military and divert its attention from the crucial oil fields and waterways in the south. In August 1979, the Guard ignored the advice of the Artesh and launched an offensive in the Kurdish town of Paveh, resulting in their complete destruction. Khomeini had to persuade the Artesh to suppress the rebels, but they remained hesitant to engage in domestic conflicts. Meanwhile, the Guard continued to quell the escalating revolutions, often managing six major protests simultaneously, including those led by militant Leftist groups in urban areas. As ethnic protests surged, the Leftist movement was embroiled in internal strife, focusing their efforts on purging the military while promoting an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist agenda. Tudeh, the dominant Leftist faction, actively participated in the purges of rival Leftist groups and coordinated with clerics to eliminate competition. Khomeini adopted a strategy of allowing Tudeh to systematically dismantle its rivals, only to turn against them in 1982, executing over 1,800 Tudeh members within three months. The Guards played a crucial role in these operations, setting a precedent for future actions that would suppress dissent through extreme violence and executions, instilling fear in the population. By late 1980, at least ten thousand Iranians had been executed by kohmitehs, and half a million had fled the country. Khomeini's popularity had plummeted, as he had reneged on nearly all agreements with members of the revolutionary coalition.

Iran-Iraq War

Khomeini would likely have lost control of the revolution had it not been for Iraq's invasion of Iran, which sparked a decade-long war that resulted in massive casualties but no territorial changes. While Saddam Hussein viewed Iran as weakened, with a revolutionary leader at a low point in support, Khomeini seized the opportunity to reassert Iranian nationalism. When Iraq invaded in September 1980, Iran's defense capabilities were nearly nonexistent. Between 40% and 60% of the military from 1979 had been lost, and with the severing of relations with the United States, over half of the military equipment purchased in the previous decade was rendered inoperable. This situation only deteriorated as the U.S. refused to supply replacement parts, and Iran lacked the technical expertise to maintain the equipment. While Iraq aimed for a swift victory to humiliate its Shiite neighbor and seize crucial oil facilities along Iran's western coast, Iran played a significant role in escalating tensions. The Revolutionary Guard attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz, a key figure in Saddam Hussein's inner circle, and armed clashes erupted along the border following an Iraqi attack on the Iranian embassy in London. With the Artesh barely operational and the Guard preoccupied with internal issues, there were virtually no effective forces available to defend against a full-scale incursion. The Guard quickly channeled their limited resources into recruiting large segments of the population, providing them with rapid two-week indoctrination and small-arms training before sending them to the front lines. Advanced training came to a halt, and even tank commanders acknowledged that tank warfare was taught only in classrooms; for most recruits, combat was the first opportunity to practice even the simplest tactics. As the Guard struggled to address the crisis, segments of the Artesh regrouped, gaining enough autonomy to mobilize and make decisions without political approval. Their ability to counter the Iraqi invasion earned them a new level of trust from Khomeini. The purging of Shah-era officers over the previous year, coupled with a gradual Islamization of the force, underscored Iran's need for a conventional military that remained relatively free from the political, religious, and economic constraints of the revolution. While the Artesh focused on coordinating military action and rebuilding their combat capabilities, the Guard continued to recruit Pasdaran (Guardians), reaching a total of 250,000 by 1985. Yet, despite this surge in numbers, they lacked sufficient weaponry, even basic small arms, to equip their forces. Additionally, Khomeini established the Basij in 1979, intending to create an internal auxiliary police force focused solely on domestic issues under the Guard’s command structure. The rapid escalation of the invasion and the urgent need to send more people to the front lines, regardless of their skills, led to the establishment of an Islamic martyrdom system that became crucial to the war effort. This intense ideological indoctrination targeted poor, rural Iranians of Persian descent, effectively convincing many men to sacrifice their lives for the revolution. While some were misled about the realities of combat and the associated risks, a significant number joined the fight fully aware of the dire circumstances. Raids and offensives often involved unarmed Basiji positioned behind the front lines, tasked with collecting weapons from fallen enemies or fellow Iranians. Furthermore, the concepts of jihad and the pursuit of martyrdom emerged as key ideological tools, fostering a fundamentalist mindset that encouraged both heroic and costly actions on the battlefield. Indoctrination occurred throughout the country, starting in early education, ensuring that an entire generation of Iranians was radicalized by warfare, Islamic fundamentalism, and the revolutionary spirit. While a conventional war raged between Iraq and Iran, Khomeini sought to leverage his Revolutionary Guard and Basij members to instigate instability throughout the region, spreading the revolutionary mandate far and wide. The Guard's new role in inciting insurrections, carrying out assassinations, and undermining regional stability has been a hallmark of Iranian revolutionary tactics that persists to this day. Khomeini formalized irregular warfare with the establishment of the Quds Force, a Guard-controlled entity dedicated to covert foreign operations, further entrenching the clerics' control over foreign diplomacy. This command structure enabled operatives to address both external and internal challenges, leading to the adoption of some of the most violent tactics in warfare to suppress domestic dissent. A prime example of this strategy is Khomeini's recruitment, training, and financing of Hezbollah, the group that continues to operate in Southern Lebanon and has significantly influenced Israeli perceptions. Iran's ability to cultivate support for Islamic ideals and a revolutionary spirit at the grassroots level has allowed it to function effectively within society, despite its struggles to achieve success on the conventional battlefield.

Overall Effects of the Iraq-Iran War

The Iraqi leaders who waged this war were politicized and largely unqualified, yet they wielded significant firepower and enjoyed the backing of several foreign nations. In contrast, Iran possessed a stockpile of advanced weaponry that was mostly inoperable and beyond repair. Its military had lost much of the technical expertise it had boasted just two years earlier and was undergoing a bloody transition. However, the Iraqis underestimated the speed with which Khomeini could instill a sense of Revolutionary jihad, rallying a large number of citizens willing to face the front lines, despite suffering extremely heavy casualties. These martyrs played a crucial role in bringing the conflict to a near stalemate, regardless of the catastrophic losses incurred. Iran experienced approximately 220,000 battlefield deaths, with over 40% of these being the uneducated, lightly armed, yet fervently Islamic Basijis. These individuals would later leverage their experiences to support the regime in quelling dissent and become the face of combat-hardened veterans addressing internal social issues. While the Artesh was instrumental in fighting and coordinating Iran's defense, Khomeini focused on building a paramilitary Revolutionary Guard that could manage military matters while also monitoring social issues, all under the control of the Shiite clerical class. By the end of the decade-long conflict, Iranian society was left devastated and weary of war, subdued into accepting Khomeini’s rule and stripped of any momentum for secessionist or neo-revolutionary movements. With the emergence of a new force dedicated to internal political suppression, the clerics seized the perfect opportunity to assert their authority and shape Iran according to fundamental Shiite ideals.

Psychology of Basij

In any armed conflict, the psychological impact on both soldiers and civilians is profound. The Iranian war generation experienced trauma similar to that of other nations, and the rigid ideological pronouncements coupled with political suppression only intensified an already volatile situation. Censored television and radio broadcasts across Iran promoted a narrative of martyrdom, sacrifice, political unity, and an uncompromising interpretation of Islam that stifled debate and diversity. As Khomeini and the clerics propagated their message, they waged a dual battle—fending off Iraqi incursions while violently suppressing dissent among the Kurds, Arabs, and Balochis. Khomeini aimed to win the war, but he was equally focused on shaping the post-war political landscape to his advantage. On some level, the 'imposed' war ultimately benefited the revolution by providing an extended period for Saddam to consolidate his power and suppress domestic dissent amid a national crisis. He recognized the fragile state of Iran’s post-revolution military and timed his invasion to exploit the ensuing chaos. The initial Iranian defense force was a patchwork of various entities: the Artesh (the conventional military), the nascent Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the Basij, remnants of SAVAK and the Ministry of Interior Intelligence, along with informal kohmitehs that operated independently of the government but engaged in limited defensive actions. However, the devastating effects of the early fighting, coupled with a subsequent stalemate that resembled trench warfare, prompted the regime to ramp up recruitment efforts, primarily targeting religious rural areas. These regions would eventually supply the bulk of the Basij forces and bear the majority of the war's casualties. Although Iran had a draft system in place, enforcement was minimal. The peer-based volunteer system proved ineffective in urban areas, where diverse opinions and a significant population of anti-war activists created resistance to conscription. Despite the staggering number of casualties, only a small fraction of Iran's population directly participated in the war. Estimates suggest that between 1.5 and 3 million soldiers engaged in operations throughout the conflict, while over 9 million men aged 15 to 35 were available during that same period. Compared to other instances of total war, this percentage of the population is remarkably low and reflects a desire to shape the future political landscape, intertwining themes of sacrifice, martyrdom, and Islam into the national dialogue. When conventional military tactics could only maintain a stalemate, Iran turned to a volunteer system that emphasized rural respectability and guerrilla warfare, prioritizing Islamic martyrdom over traditional tactics, weaponry, or strategy. Tensions mounted between rural and urban populations, fueled by perceptions of sacrifice, as Khomeini sought to undermine leftist and secular groups. He spread information—true or not—to front-line volunteers, claiming these groups were treasonous and collaborating with Iraqis to undermine Iran. Draft dodgers and those unwilling to volunteer further distanced themselves from a rural population making significant sacrifices. The Basij education, which now permeated much of Iran, fixated on the theme of Islamic sacrifice, deepening the divide within Iranian society based on participation in the war. Once the war ended, political discourse shifted dramatically as President Khatami emphasized the urgent need to tackle pressing issues, particularly the country’s ravaged infrastructure and economy after a decade of destruction. In a revealing moment, Khatami responded to criticism regarding the political rallies that featured “dancing and celebrations” by stating that there was “excessive freedom given to young women and men in order to remain loved by the people.” Despite the pressing need to address financial and social challenges, many veterans perceived this shift in dialogue as a threat to the status quo. Their status diminished as they transitioned from being seen as the saviors and defenders of Iran to mere recipients of medical assistance and pensions. Veterans regarded the youth who aspired to Western values—such as democracy and social freedom—as un-Islamic and adversaries of Iran. Conversely, the younger generation viewed the veterans' narrative of sacrifice as a means to stifle progress and development. Urban elites, who were now spearheading the economic recovery, often saw veterans as burdens on the economy, lacking the skills necessary to contribute meaningfully to the nation. This clash of ideals fostered a hierarchy of societal involvement, which would become increasingly significant as the war concluded and the Basij assumed control of domestic political operations.

Basij Relation with Guard

The Basij operate directly under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within the chain of command, receiving training, organization, and deployment under the Guard's leadership. War veterans hold the upper echelons of leadership, but a generational divide exists as newer members, largely composed of youth, have emerged fully indoctrinated in the ideology of martyrdom. These young recruits are ill-equipped for broader challenges; their training primarily revolves around Islamic principles, offering limited tactical skills and minimal influence over strategic or doctrinal matters. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij participated in nearly all martyrdom operations, often charging Iraqi defensive positions without weapons. However, when the war concluded, the Basij initially faced a crisis of purpose. Their maintenance was costly, and despite their numbers, they seemed unlikely to make a significant impact in any future conventional conflicts with regional adversaries. By 1990, their influence had reached a low point as their utility waned. In response, the clerics and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recognized the Basij's potential as a reserve domestic force capable of rapid mobilization to address domestic unrest. They were tasked with essential functions such as riot control, urban surveillance, and arrests. Overall, the Basij became the enforcers of authority, organized and created by the clerics and their IRGC proxies. With a relatively small active component of 90,000, the Basij is structured as a broad social organization primarily engaged in regional domestic operations, aiming for total social involvement in revolutionary matters. In Article 151 of the 1979 Iranian Constitution, Khomeini ensured that the government is required to provide military training programs, complete with necessary facilities, for all citizens. This training is to be conducted according to Islamic principles, enabling every citizen to participate in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the possession of arms is contingent upon obtaining permission from the appropriate authorities. The Iranian Parliament further clarified the Basij's role through a four-point agenda: defending the homeland against foreign aggression, protecting the Revolution and its achievements by countering internal threats, participating in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining the country’s moral order. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij found a significant purpose as a vast segment of the population engaged in a perilous war of attrition that heavily relied on manpower. However, once the war concluded, the clerics struggled to reintegrate the Basij into civilian life without it becoming a burden on an already strained economy. Understanding the Basij requires recognizing its low-cost training, small active component, and rapid deployment of reserves. To illustrate the spirit of the Basij through statistics, Basij commander Hossein Ta’eb claimed in 2008 that there were 13.6 million Basij participants, roughly 20% of Iran's total population. Of the total, 5 million were women and 4.7 million were children. Among the remaining four million, a significant number are likely elderly, injured, or youth, bringing the estimated count of active Basij operators down to about 1.5 million. Furthermore, interviews with Basij members reveal a certain indifference toward government policies, with many expressing a desire for social mobility. Peter Martonosi highlights one twenty-five-year-old Basij member who stated, “The only reason I stay in the Basij is for the money, but many of my friends in the Basij are unhappy with the government.” The exact size of the effective Basij force remains uncertain, and it is even more challenging to gauge how many members are genuinely loyal to the regime. However, the core group of war veterans now occupying the upper echelons of the organization has fostered an environment that reflects a strong adherence to clerical policy and devout Islam. Their commitment was notably demonstrated during the student protests of 1999 and the Green Revolution of 2009. In addition to their role as reserve police, the Basij have established dominant positions in business, agriculture, and even education—an ironic twist given their leading role in the academic purge of the early 1980s. They formed the Lecturers Basij Organization in universities, enrolling 15,000 members, which accounts for over 25% of higher education faculty, and provided career advancement support for its members. All members were required to promote their subjects under the guise of Islam, particularly from a revolutionary perspective, to influence the next generation of college-educated young adults. With 650,000 students enrolled in the Student Basij Organization, their impact on education is substantial. Recent developments have included the removal of secular curricula and professors, replaced by an infusion of Islamic ideology across virtually all subjects at the secondary level. Even at the youngest levels, the Basij run nationwide camps aimed at elementary school children, teaching them the same Islamic principles they will encounter in later years. As a direct liaison for the IRGC and the clerics, the Basij serve as grassroots mobilizers within society. While they may not shape Iranian doctrine—an endeavor reserved for the clerics and Ayatollahs—they are essential in executing directives from the highest levels of authority.

Conclusion

Understanding the full impact of the revolution on Iran is challenging, and even among Iranians, there are ongoing discussions about the nation’s direction and the relevance of revolutionary fervor in today’s context. In the years leading up to the revolution, one of the most significant factors was the Shah’s modernization and militarization of the armed forces. Ironically, while infrastructure developments were necessary and military arming could have yielded benefits if paired with rational military command and political reforms, it ultimately failed due to the suppression of dissent and a disconnect from the economic and societal needs of the populace. Additionally, the belief that technology and progress alone could not sustain a society fueled the revolution and would later shape the ideological standards during the Iran-Iraq War. The military equipment that could have been effective in combat became useless due to a lack of maintenance and replacement parts, while Iranian martyrdom and Islamic ideology provided a form of defense against Iraqi aggression. Instead, the revolution resulted in massive casualties and widespread destruction, as resources were diverted to war rather than invested in infrastructure or the economy. It equated Westernization with the failed policies of the Shah, and the subsequent pendulum swing led to a society that suppressed dissent and underwent extensive purges across academia, government, and the military. The Iran-Iraq war produced a generation of veterans steeped in the ideals of martyrdom, sacrifice, and Islam, who would eventually emerge as the next wave of leaders. However, the majority of the volunteers—who suffered the brunt of the casualties—were members of the Basij militias, whose leadership skills were often limited to small units. Initially, these typically conservative, religious individuals saw their influence wane in the aftermath of the war, but they soon carved out a political niche by supporting the regime through rapid deployments of large numbers of personnel capable of suppressing internal dissent. As evidenced during the 1999 student protests and more recently during the Green Movement, the Basij have solidified their political power by enforcing moral standards within a revolutionary and Islamic framework, thereby bolstering the regime’s control in a cost-effective manner that extends clerical influence across all segments of Iranian society. The animosity that older Basij members feel toward the 'urban elite'—whether rooted in justified grievances or not—has fueled violent crackdowns on domestic political unrest, highlighting the lingering effects of the Iran-Iraq war.